

# Israel's CoAs for Response

## Israel's Objectives for Retaliation

- ❑ Restoring the lost prestige against Iran
- ❑ Inflicting heavy costs on Iran that will deter from using direct military force in future
- ❑ Keeping the Western support and Israeli legitimacy intact
- ❑ Distancing further the Arab countries from Iran, if possible, gaining their support
- ❑ Compelling Iran to act with restraint

## Course of Actions


- **CoA-A** A Strong air strike to nuclear facilities and critical military targets (de-nuclearization)
- **CoA-B** Limited airstrike targeting missile facilities (de-capacitation)
- **CoA-C** Targeting Iran aligned groups in the region (de-proxification)
- **CoA-D** Paralyzing Iran to the extent of triggering a regime change (regime change)

## Operational factors implicating CoAs

- Geographical access (air)
- Logistical sustainability
- Available forces (air)
- Resilience of the forces
- Realisation of the objectives

**Fusion4Strategy** **Assessment:** Overall, during the counter-retaliation phase, Israel is likely to adopt a course of action aimed at degrading and destroying trust between Iran and its proxies (CoA-C), in parallel with conducting limited air strikes on Iranian missile facilities (CoA-B) to restore deterrence against Iran. The adoption of CoA-A and CoA-D seems less applicable for Israel without strong and sustained Western commitment to a war with Iran and carries unprecedented outcomes and unintended consequences, such as the risk of hyper-escalation, global economic deterioration and nuclear radiation in the region, which are likely to trigger a reconfiguration of regional alignments, a deterioration of the government-public nexus in Western governments due to a change in the behaviour of the electorate, and a strong reaction from the Arab countries.

## Objectives and Course of Actions



## Course of Actions

