


# Syria Update

28 July 2025  
ICOD: 27/07/2025

Syria	
<b>Hot Spot</b>	<h2>Syria</h2> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There is visible recognition of the STG by the IC, signaling further and engagement and integration.</li> <li>Sanction reliefs increased the likelihood for economic restructuring, attracting increasingly more countries to invest</li> <li>The US plans to withdraw its military presence, handing over counter terrorism efforts to the STG, though there are ongoing hesitations, due to the ISR's resistance and proxification efforts</li> <li>The PKK/YPG/SDF integration to the STG delays. The form of integration with/without dissolution remains as the critical point, despite the agreement of March 10.</li> <li>There are some doubts about the inclusiveness and comprehensive representation of the ethnic and religious groups, despite the STG reiterates its commitment to comprehensive government.</li> <li>ISR disruptive actions risks renewed instability. The occupation in southern SYR, proxification of Druzes and PKK/YPG/SDF, reckless military actions across SYR. However, its dedication to weak and fragmented SYR might backfire with resurgence of IRN-aligned proxies.</li> </ul>
<b>Key Trends</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>International engagement and recognition of the STG,</li> <li>The US positioning with regards to PKK/YPG and the level of support, and the future of PKK/YPG in Syria, after the call</li> <li>The level of consolidation of STG and its public approval from different sects and ethnic groups</li> <li>ISR threat perception from STG actions and developments in SYR, as ISR retains disruptive instruments</li> <li>DAESH's attempts to capitalize from the situation and the STG's ability to repel</li> <li>The future of Iranian and Russian presence and influence</li> </ul>
<b>What to Monitor</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Destabilizing attempts from internal and external actors will <i>likely</i> continue either to gain leverage and increase gains or disrupt the pace of consolidation</li> <li>The future of PKK/YPG/SDF will <i>likely</i> be the critical indicator of a unified SYR, though the debates over the scope of integration are still unfolding.</li> <li>ISR will <i>likely</i> leverage the occupied territories to trade-off its support to the PKK/YPG/SDF. ISR <i>likely</i> prefers a fragmented, unstable, and weak SYR to leverage its interests and keep its freedom of action in SYR.</li> </ul>



Indicators	Meaning	Status
Internal Cohesion	Successful formation of an inclusive government	Fragile, but promising
Economic Recovery	Effective reconstruction efforts, with international support easing sanctions.	De-stabilizing, but promising
Humanitarian Improvement	Reduction in needs through aid, with UNHCR appeals for returnee support.	De-stabilizing, but promising
Security and Stability	No major violence, with integration of armed groups into state institutions	Fragile, but stabilizing in the STG controlled areas
International Engagement and Recognition	Positive diplomatic relations with countries resuming missions	Stabilizing



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# ISR's Strategy of de-Iranification (ongoing)

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Impact: transition to new regional order (Arab-oriented or ISR-oriented?)

Constraint: regional war

Objectives	Policies	Developments	Success	Impact	Constraints
de-proxification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Countering Iran's Proxies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Iran aligned proxies were degraded, but not eliminated, <i>except Houthis</i></li> </ul>	Largely Achieved	Pressing Restraint	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Societal support</li> <li>Remaining fighting capacity</li> </ul>
de-capacitation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Maximum Pressure 2.0 and sanctions</li> <li>Military Option (ISR)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Eliminating AD systems, gaining air superiority</li> <li>Eliminating BM production and delivery</li> <li>Operation Raising Lion</li> <li>Limited and unknown impact on BMs,</li> </ul>	Partially Achieved	Pressing Restraint Unknown	Retaining capability
de-nuclearization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strategic Strikes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Operation Raising Lion</li> <li>Operation Midnight hammer (B-2s)</li> <li>Unknown impact, likely not destroyed but delayed</li> </ul>	Partially Achieved	Pressing Restraint Unknown	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Repercussions, (unintended and unprecedented)</li> </ul>
de-legitimization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Information &amp; Influence Operations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Narrative war 'raising lion'</li> <li>Clandestine networks</li> </ul>	Largely Failed	Prudence Consolidation	Credibility gap of the West
de-regionalization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Regional containment through alliances</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Largely achieved through de-proxification</li> <li>ISR and the US ineffectiveness and disagreements on the future of the region hinder the process</li> </ul>	Largely Achieved	Pressing	Undermining regional stability
Regime Change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Present ISR as the savior of society</li> <li>Return to Shah-period</li> <li>Reintegration of IRN to IC</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The regime change narrative backfired and consolidated Iran society</li> </ul>	Failed	Regional transition	Regional war



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